text > Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction (Seminar Paper)



Formalism or Functionalism; Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction
(paper written for a philosophy seminar at Duke University)

To what extent is the “formalist” label attached to Kant’s thought relevant in regard to his Critique of Pure Reason?  Charges of ‘formalism’ were advanced ever since the first Critique was published and over the centuries the arguments varied according to the methods of those who address them.  For Hegel, the author of the Critique abstracted experience from history, while Nietzsche saw in it how “the origins of the ‘will to form’ were traced to the need for ascetic philosophers to rule over the body and its affects.”[1] Max Scheler developed a Non-Formal Ethics of Values[2] built on sympathy and other affects by grounding it on a vehement critique of the Kantian ethics based on formal apriorism. Critical theorists like Adorno and Horkheimer sensed formalism in the overall new thinking of the Enlightenment with Kant as one of its major proponents, who reduced thinking to a system of principles, or a formal calculus.[3] They saw in the Kantian systematic reason a set of formal ruling principles, which have been reduced to a system and turned into another tool (instrumental reason) that operate at the expense of feelings and emotions in the hands of the rising bourgeoisie.

This paper is an attempt to interpret Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction – that part of the Critique, which sets in motion the “forms of judgment,” and from where the alleged formalism may have been originated.  We will proceed from the end of the Transcendental Analytic towards its beginning, to be precise, from the Amphiboly, where Kant reveals the importance of the “form/matter” dichotomy, to the Metaphysical Deduction proper, which introduces the logical forms of thought and their role as spontaneous unifiers of the given representations. Metaphysical Deduction seems also to be the most appropriate part of the first Critique where one could look for answers concerning the character and the origins of the “Kantian formalism.”  In the processes of writing this paper, however, a new keyword, also crucial for this Deduction has emerged, giving rise to the “form/function” dichotomy.  Such renowned interpreters of Kant as Henry Allison and Béatrice Longuenesse, on whom I will draw extensively, have emphasized the “logical functions,” which made the “forms” and consequently the alleged formalism fade at the expense of the former.  Thus, if one would like to accommodate to the discourse of the “isms” that has characterized the modern tradition of thinking from its earliest times, it might occur that “Kantian formalism” may turn out to be “Kantian functionalism.”

Kant responded to charges of formalism during his lifetime.  Proof of this is a short essay that he wrote in response to an attack by J. G. Schlosser, in which he clarified his position on form.[4] He agrees with the Scholastics that forma dat esse rei, (the essence of things consists in their form) but remaining loyal to his Copernican turn Kant suggests that this “essence” is not a property of the object but rather belongs to the intuiting subject.  “If the thing is an object of the senses, so its form is in its intuition (as an appearance), and even pure mathematics itself is nothing but a doctrine of the form of pure intuition.”[5] Kant also acknowledges that the notion of form is central for the pure philosophy, or metaphysics since “knowledge is first of all grounded on forms of thought, under which any object (the material of knowledge) [the matter or the content] may subsequently be subsumed.”   The importance of the concepts of “matter” and “form” for the discipline of metaphysics is stressed in one of the appendixes to the first Critique, entitled On the amphiboly of concepts of reflection, which is commonly known as the Amphiboly.  Here Kant begins with what could be regarded as a critique of the traditional metaphysics by stressing that “reflection (reflexio) does not have to do with objects themselves, in order to acquire concepts directly form them, but is rather the state of mind in which we first prepare ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at concepts.”[6] This process of investigation of the subjective conditions for reaching the concepts, which literally means, “a comparison of the representations in general with the cognitive power in which they are situated” (B 317) is what Kant calls the transcendental reflection.  The “determinable” and “determination” (matter and form, that what affirms and that what negates) is the last set in the group of “concepts of relations” or “concepts of comparison” (Longuenesse) to which Kant confers primacy by stating that “matter” and “form” are two concepts that ground all other concepts of reflection, namely that of “identity” and “difference,” of “agreement” and “opposition,” of the “inner” and the “outer.”

Béatrice Longuenesse has drown attention to the “striking fact” that the Transcendental Analytic opens with the parallel exposition of forms of judgments and categories and it closes with another parallel exposition, that between forms of judgments and the “concepts of reflections” or what she prefers to call “concepts of comparison.” [7] The operation of logical comparison takes place “silently.”  During this process, sensible representations are compared in order to form concepts, and this appears to be crucial for the discursive form of thought.  Kant presents this quadripartite process in the Amphiboly in order to expose Leibniz’s “confusion” of relations between objects with relations between concepts.  “Matter” and “form”  (or determinable and determination) serves as ground for the other three sets of concepts of comparison as was mentioned earlier, and this is in virtue of them playing a primal role in the act of thinking.  “Unlike other concepts of reflection, they do not reflect or guide a particular aspect of the activity of comparison, but characterize thinking in general.  All thinking is an activity of determining (giving form to) a determinable (matter).”[8] In the Amphiboly, however, Kant treats the relation set “matter/form” in terms of the a priori intuitions – space and time and not as they would refer discursively to thinking, grounding other sets of relations concepts.  Against the Leibnizian rationalism, which holds that sensations are confused perceptions, Kant sets sensations apart from the concepts of the understanding thus establishing them under a separate realm or faculty of intuition.

Kant agrees that in Leibniz’s theory, which holds no place for sensations the concepts are the matter.  That is, they are the simple elements that form combinations in which case – the “matter” is prior to the “form.”  In contrast to this intellectualist view, Kant asserts the primacy of “form” over “matter,” and this is the consequence of sensations being conferred such a special status.  The sensible intuition, according to Kant “is an entirely peculiar subjective condition,” it is a given that forms the very foundation of our perception, and as such, it molds the given sensations of external objects into appearances.  The pure a priori intuitions – space and time – cast “the matter (of the things in themselves which appear).” (B324)  Longuenesse subsumes in two steps the treatment of “matter” and “form” as offered by Kant in the criticism of the rationalist amphiboly showing “(1) that the form of the sensible given is irreducibly heterogeneous to any form thinkable by pure intellect, and (2) that in the sensible given (objects of sensible representation) the matter does not determine the form (simple elements are not prior to their combinations), but on the contrary, the form precedes and determines the matter.”[9]

To these two conclusions made explicit by Kant in the Amphiboly, Longuenesse adds two more, namely that:

“(3) if our thought is not purely intellectual [as the rationalists amphibolies assert] but conditioned by sensible intuition, the primacy of form over matter holds also for thought itself (and not merely in the sensible realm, the realm of appearances).  This primacy of the form of thought over its matter results in a completely new definition of the modalities of judgment, so that there does, in the end, emerge a correspondence, paralleling the three previous cases, between concepts of comparison and forms of judgment. (4) The primacy of the form of thought over its matter means that, in the generation of empirical concepts (the matter of thought), not only are the logical forms of judgment, but also the form of a system, at work.”[10]

By system, Longuenesse might refer to the first paragraph of the Transcendental Analytic where Kant introduces his “idea of the whole of the a priori cognition of the understanding, and through the division of concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their connection in a system.” (A65 / B90)  The second component, which acts as form in generating the empirical concepts (the matter), is what Kant developed in the much-contested Metaphysical Deduction, namely the logical forms of judgment. Kant himself stressed the architectonic importance of these three chapters  (9-12) for the overall architectonics of the Transcendental Analytic.  The logical forms set up the paths that lead to the table of categories, and from there it reaches all the way through the intuition to the principles of pure understanding.  This Deduction is often regarded as a transitory part since in these chapters Kant attempts to derive the pure concepts of understanding, or the categories from the logical forms (functions) of the judgment.   It is worth mentioning that the notion of deduction is crucial for the late, the critical Kant, and it is employed in order to justify the arrival at and the employment of some pure rules or principles, as for instance, are the pure concepts of understanding in the first Critique, the pure practical reason in the second, or the justification of the pure aesthetic judgments in his Critique of Judgment.

The Metaphysical Deduction begins with a hypothetical judgment, and it says that “if we abstract from all content of a judgment in general and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments.” (A70/B95)  Thus the basic forms of judgment have been reduced to four fundamental concepts; quantity, quality, relation and modality, and then each in turn are divided into three moments.  Allison provides a biological analogy for the functions of judgment, comparing it to that of the eye.  Accordingly, if the major function of the eye, namely to see, is the sum (the unity) of several sub-functions e.g. seeing color, shape, distance vision, etc. so the main function of the understanding, which is to judge results from “four (and only four) types of sub-function: quantity, quality, relation and modality.”[11] In short these four types of forms of judgment (four forms of thinking) are four different ways of producing a unity of representations under a concept.

The clear distinction drawn between intuitions and concepts is helpful to be regarded in context of Hume’s Enquiries where he claimed, “all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions.” The only problem that Hume did not know how to deal with concerned those ideas, which are not always, in every instance, derived from corresponding impressions” but he thought this case to be so unique that it “does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim.”[12] Kant by contrast separates concepts and intuitions as belonging to separate faculties of mind, regarding the former as performing spontaneously a set of limited functions while the later dealing with affections and being grounded on receptivity.  A representation then does not relate directly to the object but is mediated through other representations, (spontaneous concepts and/or received intuitions).  This idea is at the center of the Metaphysical Deduction since it defines the judgment in terms of a mediate cognition of an object or the representation of a representation of it. (B93)

Each of the twelve functions of judgment yields a different kind of unity.  Thus a judgment might take one moment (sub-function) from under the each of the four headings of the table of judgments (quantity, quality, relation, modality), and in result produce e.g. a “universal, affirmative, categorical and assertoric [judgment] (‘all crows are black’); or singular, negative, disjunctive and problematic [one] (‘that bird might be neither a crow nor a raven’).”[13] The functions are not only supposed to work in regard to separate judgments, as Gardner suggests above, but they are also believed to mediate the representation of representation within a given judgment, thus concerning the judgment’s intrinsic features.  In every judgment, according to Kant, “there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then, related immediately to the object.” (B93)  In his example “All bodies are divisible,” the concept ‘divisible’ relates to the concept ‘body,’ and Allison argues that the functions of quantity, quality and relation determines each other, while the “invisible” function of modality functions extrinsically, that is, relating “a particular judgment and a given body of knowledge.”[14]

Given the definition of the judgment, namely that it is “the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept,”[15] amounts for saying that this definition regards the judgment precisely in terms of its form.  “To provide a logical definition of judgment is to define its “mere form,” namely the form of activity of discursive thinking regardless of the object to which it may apply.”[16] Such a formal treatment of the notion of judgment could be made possible only from the standpoint of what Kant calls general or formal logic, which is to be distinguished from his own discovery – the transcendental logic.  While the later shows how the pure concepts of understanding relate to empirical objects, the former is concerned with “the general use of the understanding.”  In contrast to what he calls “logic of the particular use of the understanding contain[ing] the rules for the correctly thinking about a certain kind of objects” and by this we may infer that he refers to the transcendental logic, the general or formal logic “contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place, and it therefore concerns these rules without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be directed.” (A52)  The fact that general logic “abstracts from all content of cognition (weather it be pure or empirical), and concerns itself merely with the form of thinking (of discursive cognition) in general” (A131 / B170) emphasizes the Kantian a priority of the form of thought from another perspective.  Thus we may say that these two types of logic interfere throughout the Transcendental Analytic, but it must be also kept in mind that formal logic comes first or “it provides a guiding thread,”[17] since it sets up the form for the types of judgments and by doing this it lays out the field in which transcendental logic will deal later with the objects of experience.

Kant regarded the forms of judgment springing naturally from the old method of general logic, a doctrine that “traveled the secure course of science” (B viii) without essential modifications since the time of Aristotle.  The fact that there are precisely twelve “functions of unity in judgments” or forms of judgment, reflects his absolute trust in the completeness of the Aristotelian logic.  In the construction of the Metaphysical Deduction Kant saw himself as fixing the defects be it in the case of uncovering the “self-evident” forms of judgments, or in classifying, what Aristotle collected “rhapsodically from a haphazard,” namely, the categories. (A81 / B107)  The later are derived by the means of the most debated “clue” from the table of judgments, and their choice of the term also echoes “Aristotle’s notion of a category as a concept which is not derived from any more general concept.”[18] Kant conceived of the notion of category in more elaborate way, as “an a priori concept that serves as a rule for synthesizing intuitions and concepts into a complex representation of a phenomenal object, this complex representation being a judgment having as regards its form, some quantity, some quality, some relation, and some modality.”[19]

What is the relation then between the logical forms of judgment and the pure concepts of understanding – the categories?  Kant’s assumption is that the former must provide a “clue,” a guiding thread to the later.  To answer this question we may consider revisiting once again the logical definition of judgment stated in another way.  A judgment is, “the employment of concepts for the cognition of objects,”[20] which amounts for saying that to define a certain form of judgment is to delineate the form or the manner of its employment.  As Klaus Reich suggested, all concepts are in themselves ‘thoughts’ through which I represent something that is thought to be common to an infinite set of various possible representations. However, these various representations are not given by the concept in their variety.  Thus concepts by themselves does not have the function of being a cognition, but they must instead rely entirely on the judgments or more precisely on the form of the judgment of which the concepts happen to be part of.  For concepts to play a role in our cognition of objects, the form of the judgment must bestow upon concepts an additional “given condition.”[21] For instance, a categorical judgment, (the most uncontroversial one) is a relation (S is P) in which one concept with the function of predicate enters in a relation with a concept that has the function of subject.  In such a relation, according to Reich, one concept acts as the “given condition” and as such it “adds” to the other concept of the proposition.  A categorical judgment then is the relation of two given concepts, (predicate of a subject or subject of a predicate) insofar as they constitute cognition of an object.[22]

The “clue” to the categories then must derive from the inner pure logic of each of the twelve functions of judgment.  In the case of the categorical judgment, the fact that there is a relation established between a subject and a predicate, must be enough for knowing (independently of intuitions and experience) what its categorical correlate – substance – is.  “If one leaves out the sensible determination of persistence, substance would signify nothing more than a something that can be thought as a subject (without being predicate of something else).” (B187)  Accordingly every form of judgment has a rule embodied in its very logical structure.

The pure formal rules of the judgmental forms provided the “clue” to the discovery of the basic concepts of the transcendental logic but what is the status of these concepts in the understanding?  The final step of the Metaphysical Deduction is dedicated partially to this problem and the assumption is that the categories must correspond not only to the forms of judgment but they also must relate to the sensible intuition.  Kant extracted from each form of judgment a concept, which serves not only as a rule for the particular judgmental form but has also a direct relation to objects given in intuition.  For instance the “the logical function of ‘hypothetical’ judgment (if p then q), there is the category of causality (if one event, then another); and corresponding to the function of ‘categorical’ judgment (x is F), the category of substance (that which subsists and in which F inheres).”[23] Thus the Metaphysical Deduction “proper,” according to Allison, takes place precisely at the point of transition from the pure to the transcendental logic.  During this instance the mysterious “clue” must transpire.

Since the transition from the judgmental forms to the main transcendental concepts takes place within the same understanding, it follows that both domains of the understanding (forms of judgment and categories) must be governed by “the same” set of rules.  Allison even claims an “assumed isomorphism” between these two domains, an isomorphism that corresponds to the pure discursive (logical) and the real or the intuitive use of understanding.  At this point the two deductions collapse, and one of the reasons for this is that both, Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions, could not be understood independently.  In order for them to function separately one must presuppose the result of the other.  For instance, in order to show how the categories operate in the real understanding, Kant is forced to introduce towards the end of the Metaphysical Deduction the doctrine of synthesis and the respective transcendental functions of the understanding, which are the central and the most difficult aspects of the Transcendental Deduction.[24] Therefore the two uses of “the same” understanding, “is [basically] one fundamental activity of unification occurring at two [separate] levels” – wherein, each level is a distinct set of concepts ruled by two types of logic, one pertaining to the discursive act of judgment and the other to the sensible intuition.[25] In order to strengthen his argument Allison quotes from B143: “but now the categories are nothing other than these very functions [forms] for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them.”   The categories express at the level of intuition the same function as the forms of judgment express at the level of judgment, which makes them quasi-identical.  However, concludes Allison, since the manifold of intuition is essential for the categories but is totally irrelevant to the judgmental forms (functions), their distinction must be understood in terms of being functional rather than substantive.

Many of Kant interpreters had used the notions of ‘form,’ ‘function,’ or ‘sub-functions’ of judgment, applying them interchangeably to the titles and subtitles of the table of judgment, and even to the categories.[26].  Longuenesse has pointed out to this distinction claiming that Kant’s table of logical forms refers to various forms of judging as mental activities rather than to different forms of judgments per se.[27] Focusing, however, on the mental act presupposes the risk of taking the act of judgment in the psychological sense, which has actually been the point that attracted much criticism during two centuries of Kantian studies.  Arguing against any “pejorative psychologism” of the critics, Allison following Longuenesse claims that the distinction between a process or activity (function) and a product (form) is essential for the Metaphysical Deduction.  “The specific ‘forms’ of thought or judgment arise from the various expressions of the generic ‘functions’ of thinking or judging.”[28] Thus the mantra of the modernist architecture “form follows function” is perfectly suitable for Kant asserts Allison, offering in the meantime his apologies to Frank Lloyd Wright’s organicist attempts to merge the two.  Even in spite of the offered apologies the relation between ‘form’ and ‘function’ remains still obscure in Allison’s account of the Metaphysical Deduction.

One way of thinking about this relation is to consider ‘forms’ and ‘function’ of judgment separately, by attributing them distinct architectonic positions.  Drawing on Kant’s definition of ‘function’ as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one,” (A68 / B93) Allison suggests that the ‘action’ is the judgment, whose “unity” is the underlying rule in accordance with which the different representations are connected in a judgment. “Since this rule is itself a concept or a way of conceptualizing, it suggests the possibility that there may be such a rule embedded in every judgmental form, specifying the manner in which the representations must be connected insofar as one judges under that form.”[29] My reading of this sentence is the following; the quadripartite table, which comprises the four titles, namely, quantity, quality, relation and modality, is the table of ‘forms’ while the twelve subtitles under each title, are the ‘functions’ that specifies the manner in which the representations must be connected insofar as one judges under a form.  In some parts of the Critique Kant seems to entertain this view.  “If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments.” (A70 / B95)  These seem to suggest that “form” refers to the “product of understanding” while “function” to the “action of judging.”  Action, however, should not be regarded in terms of activity and force, that is a relation to a subject of the causality, but “taken in a pure, inward sense as a mere possibility (‘faculty’).”[30] Thus it remains to decide whether the nature of Kant’s transcendental reflexio relies on the forms of understanding or on the function of judgments.  This might lead to a dead point and Frank Lloyd Wright might turn right in regarding the two being inseparable.



Allison, Henry E. Kant's Transcendental Idealism. Rev. and enl. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

Beck, Lewis White. "Foreword." In Reich, Klaus' the Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, Stanford Series in Philosophy. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Caygill, Howard. A Kant Dictionary. Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Reference, 1995.

Gardner, Sebastian. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks. London: Routledge, 1999.

Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. New York, N.Y.: Continuum, 1989.

Hume, David, and L. A. Selby-Bigge. Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals. 2d ed. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951.

Kant, Immanuel, Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Immanuel Kant, Works. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Longuenesse, Beatrice. Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998.

Pippin, Robert B. Kant's Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Reich, Klaus. The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, Stanford Series in Philosophy. Studies in Kant and German Idealism. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992.

Scheler, Max. Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values; a New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism. [5th rev.] ed, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.



[1] Howard Caygill, A Kant Dictionary (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Reference, 1995). 206
Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values; a New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, [5th rev.] ed., Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology & Existential Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment (New York, N.Y.: Continuum, 1989).
The essay “Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie” is discussed in Robert B. Pippin, Kant's Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). 11
Ibid. 12
Immanuel Kant, Paul Guyer, and Allen W. Wood, Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Immanuel Kant, Works. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 366
Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). 122-23
Ibid. 148
Ibid. 149
Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Rev. and enl. ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004). 137
David Hume and L. A. Selby-Bigge, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, 2d ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1951). 19
Sebastian Gardner, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, Routledge Philosophy Guidebooks (London: Routledge, 1999). 132
Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism. 138-139
In his chapter entitled “Kant’s Conception of Judgment” Allison offers us two definitions of the Kantian judgment as they appear in Jäsche and Wiener Logic. While the above definition (Jäsche) does not seem to be concern with the objective validity, the one that was offered in the Wiener Logic states: “A judgment is generaliter the representation of the unity in a relation of many cognitions. A judgment is the representation of the way that concepts belong to one consciousness universally[,] objectively.”  Thus each versions of Kantian Logic offers a different definition of the judgment and the difference is in terms of its concern with the objective validity. Given this Allison argues that each definition amounts for an analysis of judgment considered from the standpoint of the two main logics, the Jäsche regarded in terms of the general (formal) logic while the Wiener considers judgment from the starting point of transcendental logic. I will be dealing here only with the Jäsche Logic definition of the judgment.  Ibid. 83
Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. 73
Ibid. 75
Gardner, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. 133
Lewis White Beck, "Foreword," in Reich, Klaus' the Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, Stanford Series in Philosophy. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). xiii
Klaus Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments, Stanford Series in Philosophy. Studies in Kant and German Idealism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992). 50
Ibid. 49
Ibid. 50
Gardner, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. 132-33
Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism. 152
Ibid. 155
Allison uses “judgmental function,” “judgmental sub-functions,” judgmental forms,” “categorical function,” and “categorical form” interchangeably.
Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. 5
Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism. 147
Ibid. 148
Reich, The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments. 27


Octavian Esanu, 2006